Napoleon Bonaparte vs the Duke of Wellington on the Iran War After the Midterms: Success, Failure, and What Comes Next
Democrats took both houses, Trump said part of it was Iran, and Vance said all of it was. Napoleon brings the blockade hawk’s ledger, Wellington brings the missing uranium, and both of them bring a grudge from 1815.
Why This Topic
On Tuesday night Democrats won the House and the Senate in a rout, flipping Senate seats in places like Kansas, Texas, Ohio and Maine. By Wednesday the Republican explanation had already split in two. President Trump told Fox News that “part of it was Iran,” then said he thought it was really the gasoline price, and told the Wall Street Journal he would do it all again. Vice President Vance skipped the nuance: “The reason we lost is the war.”
That split is the whole philosophical question in miniature. Is a war a success because of what it breaks, or a failure because of what it cannot hold? And now that the people who control the purse are about to change on January 3, what is the responsible thing to do with the eight weeks in between? Strike while you still can, or settle while you still have something to settle with?
We have run Napoleon Bonaparte and the Duke of Wellington on this war four times since March. This is the fifth bout, and the first in two parts: Part 1 argues success or failure, and Part 2 argues what to do now.
Why Napoleon
Napoleon is the man in history who understood pressure as a strategy better than anyone, and who paid for it most spectacularly. His Continental System, launched with the Berlin Decree of 1806, tried to strangle Britain by closing every port in Europe to British trade. It hurt Britain. It also hurt France, and enforcing it dragged him into Spain and then Russia. That makes him the natural voice for the blockade hawk case: pressure costs the person applying it, and that is how you know it is working.
He is also the right man for this particular week because he knows what it is to lose your legislature. In June 1815, days after Waterloo, the French Chamber of Representatives turned on him and demanded his abdication. In Part 2 he goes further back, to the coup of Brumaire in 1799, when he walked into the Council of Five Hundred with grenadiers. He plays it for laughs. It is also exactly the instinct of a man who sees a new Congress coming in January and thinks the answer is to move fast.
As always, Napoleon is played as a conscious performer: long winding setups, a sudden left turn, total sincerity. He knows he is pompous and he is enjoying himself.
Why the Duke of Wellington
Wellington is the general who never lost a battle and the politician who lost a government, and he needed both experiences for this episode. In the Peninsular War he fought for six years with a Parliament that could cut off his funding in any session, and he survived by sending home results the opposition could not deny. After Waterloo he commanded the Allied Army of Occupation in France, stayed until the indemnity was being paid, and pulled out two years early because the occupation had done its job. That is his whole theory of war: a defined objective, enforced terms, and an exit.
He also has the most useful scar in the series. In November 1830, as Prime Minister, he told the House of Lords the British system of representation could not be improved. His government fell within two weeks. Napoleon uses that against him in Part 2, and Wellington answers with the opposite moment from his career: in 1829 he reversed his own position on Catholic emancipation because he believed the alternative was civil war in Ireland, and he fought a duel over it. A man who has misread the country, and a man who has changed course because of it, makes a pointed contrast with a President who says he would have done nothing different.
And then there is the history between them. These two men met once, at Waterloo, and neither of them has ever let it go. Napoleon calls him an accountant in a red coat. Wellington calls him a Corsican. It is very healthy.
Who Else We Considered
Carl von Clausewitz vs Napoleon. The obvious choice for “war is the continuation of politics,” and the election made the politics impossible to ignore. But we already ran this pairing in August on when to declare the Iran war lost, and we did not want to repeat the argument with new numbers.
Edmund Burke vs Niccolo Machiavelli. Our other recurring Iran pairing. Burke on prudence and the limits of power, Machiavelli on seizing the moment, would have worked well for Part 2. We held it back because Machiavelli now has a day job in the commentary booth, and he would not stop talking about it.
Thomas Jefferson vs Alexander Hamilton on the power of the purse. A strong candidate for a constitutional episode on whether a new Congress should defund a war already underway. It is less a debate about Iran than about Congress, so we are saving it for January, when that fight actually starts.
Otto von Bismarck vs the Duke of Wellington. Two men who understood that wars must end in a political settlement, which is exactly the problem: they would agree too often. Good debates need someone who wants to keep fighting.
Why Each Man Takes the Position He Does
We have kept these two on consistent sides since March: Napoleon as the sustained pressure and blockade hawk, Wellington as the defined end state and enforced settlement man. We checked that against the historical record again in September, and it holds. Napoleon’s Continental System and his refusal of the Frankfurt Proposals in November 1813, when the Allies offered him France’s natural frontiers on the Rhine and the Alps, are the record of a man who squeezes harder when offered terms. Within six months of Frankfurt he was on Elba. Wellington’s Lines of Torres Vedras and his occupation of France are the record of a man who defines the objective, holds it, and then leaves.
In Part 1, Napoleon’s case for success is the case the administration is actually making: the old supreme leader was killed in the opening strikes, Trump says Iran’s navy, air force and air defenses are gone, and the blockade reimposed in July has turned back 144 ships. Napoleon adds the Continental System argument that pain at home is proof of pressure abroad, and he leans on Trump’s own distinction between the war and the gasoline price.
Wellington’s case for failure is built on the things nobody can account for. The IAEA reported in May that Iran held about 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, and no inspector has been inside Iran since February 28. The new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not been seen or heard in public since taking the title, and US officials believe he was seriously wounded. On October 31 Iran’s security chief said the leadership has made no new decision on its nuclear doctrine, but that this could change if the war resumes. Wellington’s point is that the war removed a man who had issued a religious ruling against the bomb and replaced him with a man who has a grievance.
Part 2 turns on the eight weeks before the new Congress is seated. Napoleon argues for the strike Israel has reportedly been pressing for, hitting Pickaxe Mountain, the site Trump named on November 2, and negotiating afterward. Wellington argues for taking the Qatari draft but resequencing it: Hormuz and the mines first, inspectors second, blockade relief in stages, frozen funds held in escrow against the uranium, Lebanon handled separately, and Congress brought into the deal rather than raced to January.
Where does each man concede ground? Napoleon admits Wellington’s steelman of the failure case is exactly right before declaring it wrong, which is very Napoleon. Wellington concedes that he himself misread the country in 1830. That concession is historically authentic, and it is what lets him make the argument about changing course with a straight face.
A Note on the Sources
For Napoleon we drew on the standard histories of the Continental System, the 1812 campaign (he sat in Moscow for roughly five weeks waiting for Tsar Alexander to negotiate, and Alexander never did), the Hundred Days, and the Frankfurt Proposals. His voice in this series owes as much to the St Helena memoirs as to anything else. On that island he spent six years explaining why each defeat was someone else’s fault, which is why Wellington’s line about his “rotation” of the weather, the Prussians, Grouchy and Belgium lands.
For Wellington the key source is his own words. After Waterloo he wrote that “nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won.” His remark that the whole art of war is finding out “what was at the other side of the hill” comes to us through John Wilson Croker, so take the exact wording with a grain of salt. His 1829 Lords speech on Catholic emancipation, where he said he would sacrifice his life to avoid even one month of civil war, is well documented, as is his disastrous 1830 speech on reform.
For the current events we relied on reporting from November 3 to 5, 2026: CBS News, Stars and Stripes, NBC News, CNBC and Al Jazeera on the election and the reaction, a Fox News voter survey in which 74 percent called the war a crucial or major factor in their vote, and the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s running war updates for the blockade and Iran’s demands. Two numbers rest on a single source and should be read with care: the Pentagon’s casualty count of 11 combat deaths and 12 non-hostile deaths (from Stars and Stripes), and the $47.1 billion cost estimate as of October. The biggest unknown is the one Wellington keeps returning to. Nobody outside Iran can say where that uranium is.
